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The subject of fiduciary duties of directors is viewed as a cornerstone of modern company 
law. The subject of fiduciary duties of directors is of paramount importance as directors have 
an abundance of discretionary powers that has far reaching consequences for the company 
itself and society in general. 
This study aims at understanding and exploring fully the fiduciary duties of a director of a 
company to act in good faith and for a proper or permissible purpose. The study seeks to 
explore these two fiduciary duties in terms of the common law as well as statute being the 
Companies Act1 (2008 Act). The study goes on to explore the relationship between the 
extensive common law on the subject of fiduciary duties and the now partial codification of 
these duties in section 76(3)(a) of the 2008 Act and articulates the current extent to which the 
common law is still relevant.  
This subject has been explored extensively in the past, however, this study seeks to revisit the 
subject from a new angle and explore the connection between the common law and the now 
partially codified version of the fiduciary duties of directors. This study also seeks to 
supplement the chasm in the existing literature regarding the fiduciary duty of a director to 
act for a proper purpose.  
Finally, this study aims at fully interpreting the primary duty of a director to act in good faith 
and for a proper purpose so as to assist directors in understanding what is expected of them 
and thus resulting in mitigating the negligent breaching by directors of companies their 
fiduciary duties. Further, this study will set down the current position of the relationship 







                                                          
1 71 of 2008.  
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1. CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION  
 
1.1 Background to the study  
The duties of directors has been a difficult yet fundamental area of company law in the past 
and even more so today. The old Companies Act2(1973 Act) did not set out clear and concise 
rules pertaining to directors duties and thus the common law was utilised extensively in this 
respect to help establish ground rules for the duties of directors.3 The 2008 Act, however, has 
partially codified these duties in section 76(3) of the 2008 Act. It must be noted, however, 
that the 2008 Act only partially codified the duties of directors and the common law still 
applies. Therefore the statutory provisions and the common law operate in tandem.  
There are two main categories of duties that a director owes in respect of the company, there 
are fiduciary duties which are largely based in common law and secondly the duty of care and 
skill that is not classified as a fiduciary duty but a separate category on its own.4 The 
fiduciary duties that the directors owe in respect of the company entail that the directors act in 
the utmost good faith and the best interest of the company. These duties are derived from the 
fiduciary relationship that exists between the directors of the company and the company 
itself.5 There are many different duties that fall under the category of fiduciary duties, such as 
the duty to act bona fide, the duty to act for a proper purpose, the duty to avoid conflicts of 
interest and the duty not to use a corporate opportunity and information for personal profit.  
 The duty of care and skill, however, operates as a separate measure that holds a director 
liable for negligent conduct and is thus a protective measure against the abuse of power that 
directors posess.6 Whilst the directors of a company are carrying out their duties they have to 
abide by the required degree of care and skill. The required degree is difficult to determine, 
however, it is possible to determine ‘care’ objectively but ‘skill’ remains subjective in 
nature.7 
                                                          
2 61 of 1973. 
3 MM Botha “ The role and Duties of Directors in the Promotion of Corporate Governance: A South African 
Perspective” (2009) 30(3) Obiter 706. 
4 N Bouman “An Appraisal of the Modification of the Director’s Duty of Care and Skill”. (2009) 21 SA Merc LJ 
509. 
5 Ibid. 
6 Ibid 510.  
 
7 Ibid 510.  
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This study however will not focus on all the duties of a director but will focus on two specific 
fiduciary duties of a director, these being the duty of a director to act in good faith or bona 
fide and secondly, the duty of a director to act for a proper or permissible purpose. 
As aforementioned the fiduciary duties of a director entails that the director act in good faith 
and in the best interest of the company.8 The director is in a fiduciary relationship with the 
company and this means he is in a trustee-like position and must thus act bona fide. In terms 
of the common law, the duty of a director to act in good faith, or bona fide, is the principal 
and most fundamental fiduciary duty from which all other fiduciary duties are derived.9 
These duties are codified in s76(3)(a) of the 2008 Act. The duty of good faith is rooted in 
honesty and thus is subjective in nature.10 This principle thus requires that the director act in 
what he genuinely believes to be the best interest of the company.11 The duty of good faith 
requires that the director apply his mind to the decision and then perform his duties in what 
he honestly believes to be in the best interest of the company.  
The statutory provision of s76(3)(a) links the duty of good faith with the duty to exercise his 
powers for a proper purpose.12 Thus it is not enough for a director to act in what he believes 
to be the best interest of the company he must also act for a proper purpose.13 Therefore it can 
be deduced that the director must subjectively have acted in what he honestly believed was 
the best interest of the company whilst still he must have objectively exercised his powers for 
a proper purpose.14  
A director when exercising his duty for a proper purpose ultimately entails that the director 
must act for a purpose of which the powers were given,15 in other words the director cannot 
misuse or abuse the powers that they were given for an improper purpose16. Therefore if 
directors use their powers for a purpose other than which it was conferred on them it will be 
regarded as an abuse of their powers17 and it would thus be a breach of the duty to act for a 
proper purpose.  The principles behind ‘exercising one’s duty for a proper purpose’ has been 
                                                          
8 Botha(see note 3;706).  
9 FHI Cassim…et al. Contemporary Company Law. 2nd ed. (2012) 523. 
10 Ibid 524. 
11 Re Smith & Fawcett Ltd 1942 1 ALL ER 542. 
12 Cassim ( see note 9; 524). 
13 Ibid 525. 
 
14 Ibid. 
15 JJ Du Plessis “Director’s Duty to use their powers for Proper or Permissible Purpose” (2004) 16(3) SA Merc LJ 
315. 
16 Ibid 310. 
17 Cassim(see note 9;525). 
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described as a mechanism the courts utilise to limit the discretionary powers conferred onto 
directors.18 
 This study will explore the fiduciary duties of a director to act in good faith and for a proper 
and permissible purpose in terms of common law and statute. The study will also determine 
any developments and changes since the partial codification of the duties of directors in 
section 76(3)(a) of the 2008 Act. This study will also evaluate how the common law and 
statute work in respect of each other and whether this has an impact on the duties of directors 
in respect of these two particular fiduciary duties, being the duty of good faith and to act for a 
proper or permissible purpose.  
 
1.2. Statement of Purpose 
The fiduciary duties of directors is an important aspect of company law as the directors of 
companies have as their primary or fundamental duty, the duty to act in good faith and the 
best interest of the company.19 The problem however, comes in with the fact that the duties of 
directors have been partially codified in s76(3)(a) of the 2008 Act and although the common 
law is still relevant the question is to what extent.  
There is a great deal of academic writing on the subject of the duties of directors, however, 
no recent discussion evaluate the changes from common law fiduciary duties to the new 
partial codification in the 2008 Act. Further, Du Plessis argues that although there is 
academic writings on general duties of directors there is a definite short fall of academic 
writing pertaining to the duty of a director to act for a proper or permissible purpose.20   
Furthermore, another criticism lies in the fact that directors are ignorant of their duties and 
this ignorance will usually lead to a breach of these duties. It must be noted that once a 
person accepts the office of a director they automatically and immediately enter into a 
fiduciary relationship with the company and thus need to know what is expected of them. 
Director’s ignorance as well as negligence has devastating repercussions for the governance 
and running of the company. Therefore a good understanding by directors of their duties will 
only mitigate against any negligence or breach of duties that may occur as a result of not 
knowing what is expected of them. 
                                                          
18Ibid. 
19 Ibid 523.  
20 Du Plessis( see note 15;308). 
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Therefore the topic of my dissertation aims at filling the chasm in the academic literature on 
the topic of the fiduciary duty to act in good faith and for a proper purpose focusing on 
evaluating any change or developments from common law to the now partial codification in 
section 76(3)(a) of the 2008 Act as well as clarifying the meaning of and the interpretation of 
these two fiduciary duties.  
 
 1.3. Research Purpose and Research Questions  
 Research purpose 
The purpose of this study is to examine the fiduciary duties of directors to act in good faith 
and for a proper purpose in respect of  modern Company law and to evaluate how these 
duties have evolved from common law to the now partial codification in statute21. This 
dissertation will not look at the other fiduciary duties but is limited and focuses on the duty to 
act in good faith and for a proper purpose. 
This study aims at understanding and exploring fully the fiduciary duty of a director to act in 
good faith and to act for a proper purpose, looking at the views and interpretations that are 
considered by the academics in this field and well as the courts view’s and interpretations. 
Further, this dissertation aims at looking at the developments or changes from common law 
fiduciary duties to the partial codification in the 2008 Act. This dissertation will also explore 
any relevant case law on this topic.  
 
 Research Questions 
1.  Which director’s owe a fiduciary duty of good faith and to act for a proper or 
permissible purpose in respect of the company? 
2. What is a fiduciary?  
3. What is the duty of good faith and what does it entail for a director? 
4. What is the duty to act for a proper or permissible purpose and what does this entail 
for the director? 
                                                          
21 S76(3) of the 2008 Act.  
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5. Where are these two duties derived from and how do these sources operate in relation 
to each other? 
6. How does the partial codification of the common law duties affect the interpretation 
of these two duties and does the common law still apply? 
 
1.4. Rationale for the Study 
The rationale behind this study is firstly, to fully explore and understand the fiduciary duties 
of a director to act in good faith and for a proper purpose, so that it may clarify any confusion 
or misconception of what is expected of a director of a company in respect of these two 
primary duties. 
 Secondly, there is a great deal of academic literature on the fiduciary duties of directors, 
however, this does not focus on the development or interpretation of these duties since the 
partial codification in the 2008 Act which is an aspect on which my dissertation focuses. 
There is also a lack of academic writing and commentary on the duty to act for a proper or 
permissible purpose which my study will aim to supplement. 
 The 2008 Act as a whole is fairly new and any further investigation into it will add onto the 
understanding of the Act, especially to a significant aspect such as the fiduciary duties of a 
director. 
Furthermore, directors play a fundamental role in the running and management of the 
company, thus a better understanding of their duties will only aid in providing a solid 
foundation of what is expected of them which will lead to better and more innovative 
corporate governance. The fiduciary duty of a director to act in good faith and for a proper 
purpose is not only linked in respect of the 2008 Act in terms of s76(3)(a) and (b) but is seen 
as the most fundamental and primary duty that a director owes to a company and thus to have 
a clear understanding of what this entails will only assist directors in understanding what is 
required of them as well as the perimeters of their powers. 
Finally, directors acting negligently, either unconsciously or consciously, in respect of their 
duties, is a common and ever growing problem in modern company law and by giving a clear 
and concise understanding of directors duties will help to mitigate against this problem. It 
will prevent directors from acting negligently as they will know exactly what is expected of 
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them as well as highlighting what they cannot do, thereby eradicating the unconscious 
negligent breach of their duties due to ignorance.  
 
1.5. Research Methodology and Theoretical Framework 
The methodology followed in this study is based on desktop research and thus comprises 
mainly on the understanding and exploration of the literature on the subject of director’s 
fiduciary duties focusing on the specific duties of good faith and to act for a proper purpose. 
This study will entail a thorough exploration of the literature on this topic and will include 
periodicals, journals, textbooks, case law and internet sources. 
A qualitative approach will be utilised throughout this study that will explore both the 
common law and partially codified version of duties of directors focusing specifically on the 
fiduciary duty of a director to act in good faith and for a proper purpose. 
 The study will fully explore what these two fiduciary duties entail looking at common law 
and statute, there will also be a historical element that will be explored during the course of 
this study that will look at explaining the significant changes and developments of the 
fiduciary duties of a director which is largely grounded in English law.  
 There will also be a descriptive element  to the study which will explain the duties of 
directors to act bona fide and for a proper or permissible purpose looking at the common law 
and statute as well as significant developments as established in case law and by academics in 
the field of modern company law. 
The final stage of this study will sum up concisely and clearly what was discussed in all five 
chapters and highlighting any noteworthy and central issues that have been identified as well 
as any developments since the partial codification of directors duties in s76(3) of the 2008 
Act. It will also include any criticisms of the new developments or shortfalls with the partial 
codification. Finally, this final stage will also set down how the common law and statute 
work in respect of each other and how it has affected the interpretation or meaning of the 
fiduciary duties of a director to act in good faith and for a proper purpose in modern company 
law. 
 Theoretical Framework 
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This dissertation will be examined largely from the position of a legal positivist. This is 
because this thesis only examines the law as it currently stands in terms of statute and 
common law and the discussion is limited to what is the written law and the interpretations 
and views that is taken by the courts and leading academics in the field. This dissertation will 
not involve any evaluation or exploration into morality or the ‘rightness’ of the law but is 
concentrated on the law itself as it stands now. Thus this dissertation is limited to the 
interpretation and evaluation of the common law and statute as it is written and interpreted by 
academics in this field and the legal meaning and principles set down by the courts. 
 
1.6. Structure of Dissertation 
The next chapter will look at the definition of ‘director’ in terms of the 2008 Act. It will 
identify which directors owe a fiduciary duty to the company and what exactly this entails. It 
will also explain what a fiduciary is and what is meant by a fiduciary relationship and how 
this operates in respect of directors and their companies. Chapter two (2) will also distinguish 
between a ‘fiduciary’ and a ‘trustee’ as these two concepts are often used to illustrate the 
nature of a fiduciary relationship.  
Chapter three (3) will look at where these two fiduciary duties are derived from looking at the 
history and relevance of the fiduciary duty. This chapter will then look at the new partial 
codification of these two duties in s76(3) of the 2008 Act and what it entails. Finally, this 
chapter will look at how the common law and the 2008 Act work in relation to each other and 
the implication of the partial codification, if any. This chapter will also discuss any relevant 
developments or criticisms since the partial codification looking at any relevant case law or 
academic opinions.  
 
 
Chapter four (4) will focus on the fiduciary duty of good faith. This chapter will fully explore 
what this duty entails taking into account common law and  the now partially codified 
fiduciary duty of good faith in section 76(3)(a) of the 2008 Act. This chapter will also look at 
any well-established principles in terms of the long standing common law as well as 
noteworthy judicial decisions. Finally, this chapter will explore the link between the duty of 
good faith and corporate governance in modern company law.  
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Chapter five (5) will then go on to explore the duty of a director to act for a proper or 
permissible purpose and what this entails in terms of both common law and statute. This 
chapter will also look at any problematic areas and relevant case law in relation to this 
fiduciary duty. 
Finally, chapter six (6) will seek to bring the exploration of these two fiduciary duties to a 
close by recapping what was discussed and finally concluding on what was observed from the 
discussion and then explain the present legal positon in respect of these two duties as well as 
the position in respect of the development from common law to statute. This chapter will also 




















2. CHAPTER TWO: DIRECTORS AND THE MEANING OF FIDUCIARY 
 
Directors have a fundamental role to play in respect of a company. They are responsible for 
the strategic decisions as well as the management of the company. Due to the power the 
directors have in respect of a company there are specific duties that are placed on directors to 
ensure that these powers are not abused and are utilised in the best interest of the company. 
This chapter will explore what it means to be a director as well as who is recognised as a 
director in terms of the definition of a director in section 1 of the 2008 Act. This chapter will 
also examine the meaning of a fiduciary and how fiduciary duties applies to directors of 
companies.  
 
2.1 The Nature of a director and the relationship in respect of the company 
Every company has a board of directors and these directors are elected by the shareholders of 
a company. Section 66(1) of the 2008 Act states that the board of directors manage the 
company. It must be noted that whilst a director may also be a shareholder he is not managing 
the company in a dual capacity but in fact is a “wearer of many hats” and when managing the 
company he acts in his capacity as a director only. Shareholders have no authority to manage 
the company. Thus the role of a director is fundamental to a company.  
The 2008 Act defines a director as-  
‘a member of the board of a company…and includes any person occupying the position of 
director or alternate director, by whatever name designated”.22 
It must be noted that the term ‘board’ used in this definition refers to a ‘board of directors’ 
and refers to the instance where the directors of a company act collectively.23 Where a board 
of directors act within the scope of their powers this is taken to be an act of the company 
itself and not merely the act of a company’s agent or representative; thus this is expressed by 
saying the board of directors are in fact an organ of the company not simply an agent of the 
company.24  
                                                          
22 S 1(1) of the 2008 Act ‘director’  
23 RC Williams Concise Corporate and Partnership Law. 3ed. (2013) 150. 
24 Ibid.  
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The main function of a board of directors is to make the prime decisions regarding the 
management and long term strategic developments of the company.25 These decisions are 
then carried out by the employees of the company. 26  
Generally the board of directors are not liable for the debts of the company because a 
company has its own legal personality, however, directors may be liable for the debts of the 
company in three instances: firstly were it is stated that the directors will be liable in the 
memorandum of incorporation in terms of s19(2) of the 2008 Act; secondly, where the 
company is a personal liability company in terms of s8(2)(c) of the 2008 Act and finally, 
where the common law or the 2008 Act calls for the lifting or piercing of the corporate veil in 
terms of s19(3). 
There are various types of directors and they have various functions within a company. A 
managing director plays two roles, one as a director of the company and one as the manager 
of the company; thus he is both a director and employee of the company.27 It must be noted, 
however, that generally directors are not employees of a company, there is no contract of 
employment unless they have a dual capacity as in a managing director, in which the person 
acts as a director and an employee of the company but not simultaneously.28 In other words 
the managing director will act in his capacity as a director when acting with the board but as a 
manager in the daily running of the business. Furthermore, directors do not act under the 
instructions of an employer as in the case of an employee.29 There is an exception to this 
however, if the director is an executive director which means there is a contract with the 
company to work full time for the company, an example of this would be a managing 
director.  
There is no distinction drawn between an executive and non-executive director in the 2008 
Act, however, in practise they are often distinguished from each other.30 An executive 
director is someone who works on a permanent basis for the company whilst a non-executive 
                                                          
25 Ibid.  
 
26 Ibid.  
 
27 Ibid 151.  
28 Ibid 154.  
29 Ibid 153.  
30 Ibid 154.  
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director is someone whose duties comprise of attending sporadic meetings with the board of 
directors.31 In Howard v Herrigel32 the court held that- 
 ‘it is unhelpful and even misleading to classify company directors as ‘executive’ or ‘non-
executive’ for purposes of ascertaining their duties to the company or when any specific or 
affirmative action is required of them. No such distinction is to be found in any statute. At 
common law, once a person accepts appointment as a director, that person becomes a 
fiduciary in relation to the company and is obliged to display the utmost good faith towards 
the company and in his dealings on its behalf’.33 
A de facto director is not a term found in the 2008 Act however, it refers to a person who 
performs the functions of a director without holding the office of director in terms of law.34 A 
shadow director again is not found in the 2008 Act however, it refers to a person who is not 
appointed as a director but whose direction and instruction is often followed by the actual 
board of directors.35 A de facto director acts openly as if he is a director of the company 
whilst a shadow director is a third party who secretly exerts influence on the board of 
directors in breach of their fiduciary duties.36 A shadow director causes the board to breach 
their fiduciary duties because the directors are meant to bring an independent mind to every 
issue regarding the company and act in accordance with what he genuinely believes to be the 
best interest of the company.37 Thus, by being influenced by the shadow director the board of 
directors act as his “puppet” and merely follow his instructions without fulfilling their duties 
as a director and applying their own mind to the matter, therefore breaching their fiduciary 
duty to the company.38  
Williams has submitted that some doubt is expressed in respect of whether a de facto director 
and a shadow director fall within the ambit of the definition of a director in terms of the 2008 
Act.39 As aforementioned the 2008 act defines a director as: 
‘a member of the board of a company…and includes any person occupying the position of 
director or alternate director, by whatever name designated”.40  
                                                          
31 Ibid.  
32 1991 (2) SA 660 (A). 
33 Howard v Herrigel Supra.  




37 Cassim(see note 9; 525).  
38 Williams (see note 23;152).  
39 Ibid 153.  
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Williams argues that this definition is broad enough to include a de facto director however, 
does not include a shadow director due to the fact that a shadow director does not ‘occupy a 
position’.41 It must be noted however, that the act goes on to say that- 
‘a person becomes a director when that person has been appointed or elected or holds office, 
title or designation or similar status that entitles that person to be an ex officio director of the 
company’42 
Williams thus submits that the definition in the 2008 Act is broad enough to include that of a 
de facto director but not broad enough to include that of a shadow director.43 
In contrast to this Cassim describes the definition of a director in the 2008 Act as ‘open-
ended, non-exhaustive definition of a director which is both tautologous and unhelpful’44 
Cassim goes on to criticise the definition in section 1 of the 2008 Act arguing that the 
definition is inadequate because all that it does is allows certain people to be categorised as 
directors even if they are described under different names or designations.45 Finally, Cassim 
argues that the definition of director is so broad that it encompasses most types of directors 
including executive and non-executive directors, nominee directors and alternate directors as 
well as de facto and shadow directors.46  
Therefore although Williams also finds the definition of director in section 1 of the 2008 Act 
problematic he submits that the definition is not broad enough to include a shadow director as 
a shadow director does not “occupy a position” as required by the definition.47 In contrast 
Cassim argues that the definition is broad enough to in fact include a shadow director.48 
Cassim explains that this is because if the board is allowed to act in accordance to the advice 
or direction of a third party, this third party may be regarded as ‘occupying the position of a 
director’.49 Thus Cassim argues that a shadow director falls within the ambit of the act as the 
legislature failed to adopt s1(2) of the 1973 Act which excluded from the definition of a 
director a third party that gives advice or instructions to the board in a professional capacity. 
Thus it is argued that the definition director in section 1 of the 2008 Act is wide and open-
                                                                                                                                                                                    
40 S 1(1) of the 2008 Act ‘director’  
41 Williams (see note 23;153).  
42 S66(7) of the 2008 Act.  
43 Williams(see note 23;153).  
44 Cassim(see note 9;509).  
45 Ibid 510.  
46 Ibid.  
47 Williams(see note 23;153).  




ended which results in almost all types of directors to fall within the ambit of the definition 
and be subject to the fiduciary duties of a director.50 
It must be noted however, that the fiduciary and statutory duties are not limited to directors 
only but also encompass senior employees and senior managers of the company.51 The 2008 
Act also extends these fiduciary and statutory duties to prescribed officers52 and members of 
the audit committee or board committee even if they are not members of the board of 
directors in terms of section 76(1)(a) and (b) and even if they are entitled to vote at board 
level.53 The reasoning behind this inclusive approach is that board committees and 
particularly audit committees play a central role in the functioning of corporate boards and 
thus the fiduciary and statutory duties should similarly extend to these members of the board 
committees and audit committees as they do with directors.54 A direct result of this inclusive 
approach is that non-directors are forced to bear the weight of onerous duties being placed on 
them although they have no decision making power. In Robinson v Randfontein Estates Gold 
Mining Co Ltd55 Bristowe AJ stated ‘For as his power grew so his responsibility grew also’ 
however, under section 76(1) (a) and (b) of the 2008 Act there is a result of greater 
responsibility being placed on persons with no power.56  
Therefore when referring to the duties of directors, it must be noted that ‘directors’ is applied 
in a broader sense than expected due to the wide and open-ended definition of director in 
section 1 of the 2008 Act.57 
 
 
                                                          
50 Ibid. 
51 Laskin J in Canadian Aero Service Ltd v O’Malley (1973) 40 DLR (3d) 371 (SCC) 381; Phillips v Fieldstone Africa 
(Pty) Ltd 2004 (3) SA 465 (SCA). 
 
52 Section 1 of the 2008 Act describes prescribed officers as ‘the holders of an office within a company that has 
been designated by the minister in terms of s66(10). Regulation 38 of the Companies Regulations provide that 
a prescribed officer is person who exercises general executive control over management of the whole or 
significant portion of the business and activities of a company, or a person who regularly participates to a 
material degree in the exercise of general executive over the management of the whole, or significant portion 
of the business and activities of the company. The definition of prescribed officers is meant to identify persons 
who are involved in the management and running of the company.  
53 Cassim(see note 9;511).  
54 Ibid 512.  
55 1921 AD 168 at 266. 
56 Cassim(see note 9;512).  
57 W Geach “Statutory, Common law and other Duties of Directors” (2009) Paper for the CIS Corporate 
Governance Conference. 5. 
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2.2 The meaning of fiduciary and the significance of it in respect of directors of a company 
The fiduciary duties of a director is based on good faith, loyalty and an avoidance of any 
conflicts of interest.58 
A fiduciary is defined as- 
 ‘a person in a position of trust or occupying a position of power and confidence with respect 
to another, such that he is obliged by various rules of law to act solely in the interest of the 
other, whose rights he has to protect’.59  
Many persons may be classified as fiduciaries including trustees, agents, directors and 
attorneys. The content of this duty however, is not set and may vary depending on the nature 
of the relationship and purpose of the relationship between the parties.60 
In English v Dedham Vale Properties Ltd61 Slade J held that the various categories of 
fiduciary relationships is never closed and that fiduciaries are not limited to a fixed number of 
defined relationships. 
In the case of Phillips v Fieldstone Africa (Pty) Ltd62 it was held that the fiduciary duty of a 
director is a question of fact that needs to be deduced from considerations of the nature of the 
relationship as well as other relevant factors or circumstances.63  
Each director owes a fiduciary duty to the company in his own capacity although the board of 
directors acts collectively.64  When a person is in a fiduciary relationship this entails that the 
person in question act in with the utmost good faith in respect of the other party.65 A fiduciary 
relationship is comprised of trust and confidence.66A fiduciary is someone who acts on behalf 
of and in the best interest of the other person.67 In Bristol and West Building Society v 
Mothew68 the court held that a fiduciary is a person who acts for or on behalf of another 
person that gives rise to a relationship of trust and confidence between the parties. 
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It has been noted that generally in a fiduciary relationship one party is at the mercy of another 
party’s discretion.69 In the case of Hospital products Ltd v United States Surgical 
Corporation70 the court stated the following- 
‘.. a fiduciary relationship may arise because on the facts a person has been appointed to act 
for the benefit of another whose appointment carries power that could be exercised to the 
detriment of another. A fiduciary has a special opportunity to exercise power or discretion to 
the detriment of another, who is vulnerable to abuse by the fiduciary.’ 
The court held further that the crucial feature of fiduciary relationships is that the fiduciary 
undertakes to act for or on behalf and in the interests of another in the exercise of power and 
discretion that will resultantly effect the interests of the other person.71 
The duties of directors are divided into two broad categories, firstly the fiduciary duties of 
honesty, good faith and loyalty and the second category of duty to act with care and skill. It 
must be noted that the second category of the duty of care and skill is not a fiduciary one but 
a general duty imposed on directors to curtail negligence.72 
When a person is in a fiduciary relationship with that of another he is under a legal duty to act 
in the utmost good faith in respect of that person.73 A director’s fiduciary duties are divided 
into various headings, however, this study focuses on two main duties which are the duty to 
act bona fide or in good faith and secondly the duty to act for a proper or permissible 
purpose. It must be noted that if a director breaches this fiduciary duty that he owes to the 
company he will be liable to the company for any damages it may have suffered as a result or 
the company may demand the director disgorge the profit made as a result of the breach of 
the fiduciary duty.74 
The general principle is that a director is a fiduciary of the company and thus has a primary 
duty to act in good faith and for the benefit of the company. This duty is inflexible in nature 
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and strictly endorsed by the courts as was held in the case of Parker v McKenna.75 The 
rationale behind this strict approach is to ensure that a fiduciary does not abuse his power76. 
 
2.3. To whom the Directors owe their fiduciary duty 
Each director owes a fiduciary duty to the company individually and in his or her own 
capacity as a director. 77This is true although the board of directors act collectively when 
making decision regarding the running and management of the company. Due to this fact a 
director may not attempt to avoid liability arguing that he or she merely went along with the 
collective decision of the board.78  
In the case of Howard v Herrigel79 the principle was established that immediately upon a 
party accepting his appointment as a director he would become a fiduciary in respect of the 
company and thus is under a duty to act in the utmost good faith towards the company and in 
the company’s interest when acting as an agent of the company.80  
The fiduciary duty that directors owe is in respect of the company. This principle was 
illustrated in the landmark decision of Foss v Harbottle81 which became known as the proper 
plaintiff rule and states that where a company has suffered a wrong, the company itself will 
be the proper plaintiff. This is because the company has suffered the wrong therefore the 
company itself has the locus standi to sue.82  
Another case that illustrates that the fiduciary duties that a director owes is in respect of a 
company was illustrated in Parke v The Daily News Ltd83 the facts in short are as follows: the 
Daily news Ltd was a company in which the board of directors decided to sell the entire 
company to a competitor arguing that they would take all the profit and divide it amongst the 
employees of the company. The shareholders of the company were upset and demanded a 
return on their shares. The board of directors contented that they were acting in the best 
interest of the company. The court rejected this contention arguing that it was nonsensical as 
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the company was going out of existence thus it could not be in the best interest of the 
company. The court went on to add that the directors argument that they owed a duty to the 
employees of the company as well could not be accepted as the fiduciary duty that the 
directors owe in in respect of the company and indirectly in respect of the shareholders.84  
The aim of directors is to see the success of the company and the collective best interests of 
the shareholders of the company. In Cohen v Segal85 the court held that the directors of a 
company occupy a fiduciary position towards the company and thus must act in good faith 
solely for the benefit of the company and no ulterior motives.86  
Millet LJ made a profound statement in respect of directors’ fiduciary duties in Bristol and 
West Building Society v Mothew87 - 
‘The distinguishing obligation of a fiduciary is the obligation of loyalty. The principle is 
entitled to the single- minded loyalty of his fiduciary. This core liability has several facets. A 
fiduciary must act in good faith; he must not make a profit out of his trust; he must not place 
himself in a position where his duty and his interests may conflict; he may not act for his own 
benefit or the benefit of a third person without he informed consent of the principle. This is 
not intended to be an exhaustive list, but is sufficient to indicate the nature of the fiduciary 
obligations. They are the defining characteristics of a fiduciary.’88 
In the UK and USA there is a new developing trend that impose the fiduciary duty towards 
shareholders as well however, this is not yet set in South African law.89 The modern thinking 
by academics now is that directors do not only owe a fiduciary duty in respect of the 
company and shareholders indirectly, but owe a duty to society at large by way of preventing 
pollution or harm to the environment.90  
 
2.4. Directors versus Trustees 
Fiduciary duties were derived from English law based on the relationship of loyalty and 
honestly that is similar to those encompassed by trustees.91 Directors are often associated or 
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compared to a trustee, because both a director and a trustee are vested with the power to 
handle the affairs and manage the property of a third person.92  A fiduciary duty is often 
referred to as a trustee-like duty.  The biggest similarity lies in the fact that both trustees and 
directors have to act in the utmost good faith in respect of their beneficiaries and company 
respectively.  The difference, however, lies in the fact that a trustee must act conservatively 
and cautiously in his position whilst a director is encouraged to take risks.93  In Daniels v 
Anderson94 the court stated the following in respect of trustees and directors- 
‘ while the duty of a trustee exercises a degree of restraint and conservatism in investment 
judgements, and that of a director may be to display entrepreneurial flair and accept 
commercial produce a sufficient return on capital invested.’95 
It should be noted that a director is not an employee of the company nor does he work under 
the instructions of another and he is obligated to applying his own mind to the issues at 
hand.96 Therefore no matter the similarities of both trustees and directors a director is not a 
trustee. It is said that directors’ have trustee-like duties but directors are not trustees and their 
relationship in respect of the company is seen as being sui generis97 in our South African 
law98 
The case that is often used to describe this trustee like duty is that of Keech v Sandford99 
which involved a trust in respect of a minor.  In this case the trust was made up of one asset 
being a property that was being leased, the lease however, was coming to an end. The trustee 
asked the lessor to renew the lease in respect of the trust, the lessor refused but leased the 
property to the trustee in his personal capacity. The court held that the trustee was the only 
person who could not take up the lease as he learned about it by virtue of his position, thus he 
could not benefit without the consent of the minor which would be impossible. Thus the 
principle was established that similarly to trustees, directors too may not be permitted to take 
up opportunities for their own gain by virtue of his position unless the company has 
consented to this.100   
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It is clear from this chapter that directors of a company are responsible for the fundamental 
decisions and the management of a company and that these decisions are then carried out by 
the employees of the company.101 Therefore although there are various types of directors and 
directors may also be employees of the company, as in the case of a managing director, the 
director wears more than ‘one hat’ and when acting with the board he only acts in the 
capacity as a director.102  
The 2008 Act recognises that directors are appointed into their position and that they act 
collectively as the board of directors when binding the company. Further, the definition103 in 
the 2008 Act recognises a person who occupies the position of director by any alternate name 
thus Williams argues that due to this the definition is broad enough to recognise a de facto 
director but not a shadow director.104 In contrast to this Cassim argues that the definition of 
director in section 1of the 2008 Act is open-ended and wide enough to include most directors 
and does in fact include a shadow director as the legislature failed to include s1(2) of the 
1973 Act which excluded a third party that gives advice or instructions to the board in a 
professional capacity. Therefore Cassim argues that a shadow director may fall within the 
ambit of the definition of a director in the 2008 Act. Overall however, the definition provided 
for in section 1of the 2008 Act is problematic and is viewed as being too broad.  
Upon a person being elected as a director the director immediately owes a fiduciary duty to 
the company to act in the utmost good faith towards the company.105 This fiduciary duty 
applies to each director individually and applies in respect of a company and indirectly 
toward the shareholders as held in Parke v The Daily News Ltd.106 A fiduciary relationship is 
based on loyalty trust and confidence and this is what directors’ owe to their company. 
Finally, it must be noted that although trustees and directors are often compared and a 
fiduciary duty is seen as a trustee-like duty, there are some differences, the main being that 
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3. CHAPTER THREE: THE ORIGIN OF THE FIDUCIARY DUTIES AND THE 
RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE COMMON LAW AND STATUTE 
 
This chapter looks briefly at the origin of the fiduciary duties of directors to act in good faith 
and for a proper purpose. The chapter then goes on to focuses on the relationship between the 
common law and the now partial codification of directors’ duties in statute in terms of section 
76(3)(a) of the 2008 Act. This chapter will also discuss any developments or changes since 
the partial codification of directors’ duties in terms of section 76(3) of the 2008 Act. Finally 
the chapter will explore the current stance on the fiduciary duties of directors and how the 
common law and statute react in relation to each other. 
 
3.1. Introduction  
Our common law in South Africa is largely adapted from that of English law and other 
common wealth jurisdictions.108 Prior to the 2008 Act director’s rights and duties were 
derived mainly from contracts entered into with the company, the memorandum of 
incorporation, the articles of association and of course the extensively from the common 
law.109 The common law and judicial decisions was thus previously the primary source of the 
fiduciary duties of a director. 
 As aforementioned the common law was influenced extensively by English law and English 
case law, it is said there are more reported cases regarding the fiduciary duties of directors 
than any other aspect of corporate law in South Africa.110 There is also a great deal of 
academic writing on the subject of fiduciary duties of directors111 with the exception of the 
duty to act for a proper or permissible purpose, which my study aims to expand on. As a 
result of this a very expansive and well established common law has developed through the 
years in respect of the fiduciary duties of directors.112  
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However, the 2008 Act has now partially codified the fiduciary duties of directors in section 
76(3). This study is limited however to the specific fiduciary duties of a director to act in 
good faith and to act for a proper purpose and the discussion within this chapter will be 
limited to these two fiduciary duties only.  
The common law duties of a director are referred to as the fiduciary duties of a director and is 
entrenched in good faith, honesty and loyalty.113  Fiduciary duties were derived from English 
law based on the relationship of loyalty and honestly that is similar to those encompassed by 
trustees.114 Fiduciary duties are of paramount importance to a well- structured and developed 
corporate law system.115 
In terms of the 2008 Act the fiduciary duties of a director are ‘mandatory, prescriptive and 
unalterable, and apply to all companies’ and companies are unable to contract out of or 
exclude these duties by way of agreement.116 The fiduciary duties are preventative in nature, 
and thus another purpose behind them is to deter directors from abusing their office and the 
powers conferred upon them and offer a degree of protection to the company and the 
stakeholders.117 
 
3.2. The Partial Codification of fiduciary duties of directors and the relationship between the 
statute and common law 
The partial codification of directors’ fiduciary duties in section 76(3) of the act is a new and 
significant development in the 2008 Act.118 Emphasis must be placed on the fact that the 
2008 Act has only partially codified the fiduciary duties of directors this means that it is not 
an exhaustive and fully codified body of rules.119  
The 2008 Act does not expressly state that the statutory provisions do not substitute the 
common law provisions and thus the stance in terms of the interpretation of statutes, is that a 
statute “will not unnecessarily amend the common law”120. Therefore it can be deduced that 
the legislature did not intend to amend or replace the common law in any way and it is simply 
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a partial codification of the fiduciary duties.121 The current position in our South African Law 
can be described simply as- 
 “…the South African Companies Bill now contains statutory provisions dealing with the 
directors’ general duties and…these duties are comparable to director’s common law 
duties.”122  
The South African position therefore is that section 76(3) of the 2008 Act partially codifies 
the duties of directors but this does not replace or amend the common law in any way but in 
fact both the common law and the 2008 Act operate in tandem or as Cassim puts it “in 
parallel”.123  
The purpose behind partial codification of directors’ fiduciary duties is to install clarity and 
stability into the company law.124  A survey done in England showed that many directors are 
unaware of what their duties are and what is expected of them125 thus the partial codification 
is a mechanism to help create a clear code that will assist directors in establishing what their 
duties are and what is expected of them. It must be noted that directors must be 
knowledgeable about what is expected of them when acting in their capacity as directors or 
exercising their powers as directors, because, the conduct of diretcors can directly influence 
the profitability and success of a company as well as having far reaching effects such as 
influencing investments both internationally and within the Republic.126Another reason for 
the partial codification is that it presents an opportunity for the legislature to rectify and 
resolve any existing problems that may be present in common law including any conflicting 
judicial decisions.127   
Due to the well- established and expansive common law on the subject of duties of directors, 
however, it would be impossible to make an exhaustive codified version.128 Thus the partial-
codification route was taken in accordance to international trends that are attempting to make 
the duties of directors more accessible.129  As aforementioned the act does not expressly 
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exclude the common law and the interpretation is that both the common law and the 2008 Act 
are to operate parallel to each other.130  
 The partial codification does not attempt to encompass the complex nature and all the 
relevant detail of director’s fiduciary duties within the ambit of section 76(3) of the 2008 
Act.131 The 2008 Act also preserves the applicability of the common law in its entirety and 
the Act expressly preserves the common law remedies for breach of fiduciary duties by 
directors.132  
Due to the lack of detail given in section 76(3)(a) of the 2008 Act, the fiduciary duties of 
directors cannot be properly understood or interpreted without the background and extensible 
well developed common law regarding fiduciary duties of directors, including judicial 
decisions and foreign decision, particularly English decisions which formed the basis of the 
South African common law on fiduciary duties of directors.133  
Therefore the partial codification has resulted in an overlap between the common law 
fiduciary duties of a director and the statutory version of the fiduciary duties of a director and 
directors have to now comply with both common law and statutory fiduciary duties.134   
 
3.3. Academic Opinions on the Partial codification of the Fiduciary duties of Directors  
Cassim states that section 76(3) of the 2008 Act which deals with the fiduciary duties of a 
director is not free from ambiguity135 and argues further that although the modern trend is to 
codify the duties of directors, in terms of what was done in South Africa, Cassim argues that 
it was ‘step in the wrong direction’.136 The rationale behind Cassim’s argument is that the 
legislature failed to address the existing problems with the duties of directors and merely 
restated the common law in a brief codified version that served no purpose.137 Cassim 
concludes that a ‘golden opportunity’ was lost in that the legislature failed to address the 
uncertainty and conflicting judicial decisions regarding the fiduciary duties of directors and 
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instead restated the common law but in such a limited respect that it cannot be understood 
except under the background of the common law.138 
McLennan supports the view of Cassim discussed above and stated that his main reservation 
towards the partial codification of the fiduciary duties is, firstly, whether it was necessary 
when the common law on the subject is so vast and well developed and, secondly, would the 
partial codification create problems with the interpretation of provisions and actually create 
more problems than solving any and giving clarity to the common law.139 Mclennan 
articulated his stance on the matter soundly stating- 
‘ In my view, the provisions overlegislate the issues. In particular, where a topic is governed 
satisfactorily by the common law, let it remain so. The more legislation there is, the more 
interpretation will be necessary.’140 
In contrast to this, Botha, has expressed support for the partial codification of the fiduciary 
duties of directors stating that the partial codification was a move in the right direction.141 
Botha argues that the partial codification was necessary due to the shortcomings in the 1973 
Act and also leads to better protection for stakeholders of the company.142  
 
3.4. Developments since the Partial codification 
As far as developments to the fiduciary duties of a directors since the partial codification, in 
respect of the duty to act in good faith for a proper purpose as per section 76(3)(a) of the 
2008 Act, there has been almost no change or alteration to the common law interpretation of 
these two specific duties.  
Cassim describes the partial codification of these fiduciary duties in section 76(3)(a) of the 
2008 Act as simply being declaratory of the common law fiduciary duties.143  In other words, 
this means that the partial codification in respect of these two particular fiduciary duties has 
no real legal effect on the common law fiduciary duty to act in good faith and for a proper 
purpose.144 In essence the common law is merely restated in section 76(3)(a) of the 2008 Act.  
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Fienstein145 agrees with Cassim’s argument that there is in fact no development to the 
common law in respect of section 76(3)(a) of the 2008 Act, she states that the fiduciary duties 
that have now been partially codified will be no different than under common law.  
There is however, one small development and that is that since the partial codification 
directors now owe a fiduciary duty to act in good faith not only to their company but any 
subsidiary of that company as well.146 Williams also takes cognisance of this fact and states 
that the duty of good faith has been broadened to include that directors now owe this duty in 
respect of subsidiary companies as well.147 
Therefore it may be said that the partial codification of the fiduciary duties to act in good 
faith and for a proper purpose has not been developed or altered and is merely the common 
law restated148, however, this is subject to one exception which is that the duty of good faith 
has now been expanded to include subsidiaries for the first time.149 
 
3.5. Conclusion  
As explained throughout this chapter the common law is vast and well established in respect 
of the fiduciary duties of directors, it is largely influenced by English law and over the 
decades the common law has become the main source regarding the fiduciary duties of 
directors.150 Since the 2008 Act however, most of these common law fiduciary duties have 
now been partially codified in section 76(3) of the Act.  The relevant question however, 
seems to be, to what extent does the common law apply. As aforementioned the partial 
codification of these directors’ duties have not rendered the common law irrelevant to any 
extent and instead both sources work together in tandem.151 Thus in answering this question it 
would be seen from above that the common law is still very much in operation and still 
relevant and the directors of companies are obliged to follow the fiduciary duties are laid 
down in both the common law and statute.152 The main reason for the partial codification was 
for the legislature to give clarity to the law and assist in rectifying any problematic areas such 
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as the conflicting judicial decisions153 however, academics have interpreted the partial 
codification of the fiduciary duties of directors as a wasted opportunity154 as there has been 
little to no development of the common law regarding the fiduciary duty to act in good faith 
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4. CHAPTER FOUR: THE FIDUCIARY DUTY OF A DIRECTOR TO ACT IN 
GOOD FAITH  
 
This chapter will focus on the primary duty of a director to act in good faith or bona fide in 
respect of the company. This chapter will examine and explain exactly what is required by 
directors to fulfil this duty and will look at this duty of good faith in terms of the common 
law as well as statute. This chapter will also explore the link between the duty of good faith 
and corporate governance in modern company law. This chapter will also look at noteworthy 
case law and academic opinions regarding the duty of good faith.  
 
4.1. Introduction 
As aforementioned the duties of directors fall within two main categories, firstly fiduciary 
duties, which stem from their trustee- like relationship in respect of the company. Secondly, 
the duty of care and skill which is not a fiduciary duty but a completely separate category on 
its own, which in essence comprises the duty to not act negligently in the carrying out of their 
duties.156  
This study, however, focuses only on fiduciary duties of directors, and specifically, on the 
duty to act in good faith and for a proper or permissible purpose. The fiduciary duties of a 
director are divided into a number of sub-categories such as: the duty to act in good faith; the 
duty to act for a proper purpose; the duty to avoid conflicts of interests and the duty not to use 
corporate opportunities or information for personal gain.157 It must be noted however, that 
although the fiduciary duties of director of a company is divided into the various categories  
they are not in fact bound exclusively to that particular category and  there tends to be an 
overlap in their application.158 Thus it is said that although the fiduciary duties of directors 
are compartmentalised for the benefit of understanding what is expected of directors, these 
duties are not ‘mutually exclusive’159 and there is a common thread that continues throughout 
all the categories of fiduciary duties. It is thus the belief that the primary duty of a director is 
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to act bona fide and in the best interest of the company and from this over-arching duty all 
other fiduciary duties stem.160 
Further, it must be noted that if the director in question is both a director and a shareholder of 
the company then he does not owe any fiduciary duty to the company when acting in his 
capacity as a shareholder but is limited to the fiduciary relationship with the company only 
when acting in his capacity as a director of the company.161 The director does not act in both 
capacities at one given time but is a ‘wearer of many hats’ and thus cannot act in both 
capacities as a director and a shareholder simultaneously. The director therefore only owes a 
fiduciary duty to the company when he is acting in his capacity as a director.162 
In Phillips v Fieldstone Africa (Pty) Ltd163 the court held that the nature and extent of a 
fiduciary duty is a question of fact that needs to be determined through an evaluation of the 
relationship between the director and his company as well as any relevant circumstances.  
The duties of directors are derived from two sources the common law and the 2008 Act. The 
2008 Act has partially codified the common law duties, however, these two sources still 
operate in tandem.164 Cassim states that ‘the duties are meant to be prophylactic and 
preventative’ in nature.165  
Section 76(3)(a) and (b) of the 2008 Act states-  
(3)  Subject to subsections (4) and (5), a director of a company, when acting in that capacity, 
must exercise the powers and perform the functions of a director 
 (a) in good faith and for a proper purpose; 
 (b) in the best interest of the company. 
 
The duty to act in good faith is the primary duty from which other fiduciary duties flow, it 
encompasses in it a duty to exercise an independent judgement as well as to act for a proper 
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purpose. Thus the legislature has linked these two fiduciary duties in section 76(3)(a) of the 
2008 Act.166  
The fiduciary duty of a director to act in good faith is seen as the principal, overriding duty 
from which all other fiduciary duties emerge.167 The duty of good faith is one that is every 
present and continues throughout all the fiduciary duties that a director has. The duty of good 
faith is based on the trustee-like position that directors are in with respect to the company and 
thus encompasses a high degree of good faith, honesty and loyalty.168 
 
4.2. The content of the duty to act in good faith and the best interest of the company 
As aforementioned every director has the duty to act in good faith and in what he honestly 
believes to be the best interest of the company when exercising his powers as a director.169 
This is therefore a duty of subjective good faith as the focus is on what the director believed 
to be in the best interest of the company. Hahlo stated that the ‘paramount duty of directors, 
individually, and collectively, is to exercise their powers bona fide in the best interests of the 
company’170 the basis of this duty is honesty, trust and loyalty. 
 This common law duty has been partially codified in s76(3)(a) of the 2008 Act and states- 
‘a director of a company, when acting in that capacity, must exercise and perform the 
functions of a director…in good faith’. 
The partial codification of this common law duty is very brief and lacks any detail that 
indicated what is meant by ‘good faith’ and what exactly does this duty entail. Due to this 
lack of detail provided by the act it is necessary to look to the common law, the courts and 
judicial decisions to determine the true content of this duty. 
It must be noted that the duty of good faith refers to subjective good faith therefore if a 
director’s conduct is ever called into question before the courts in respect of the duty to act 
bona fide, the question that arises is not whether the court itself believes that the act taken by 
the director in question was in fact done in good faith and the best interest of the company, 
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but whether the director genuinely believes that his conduct was in the best interest of the 
company.171 The board of directors have a more extensive knowledge, qualification and 
expertise in the field of what will qualify as being in the best interest of the company in 
contrast to judges, whose expertise do not necessarily extend to the management and running 
of a company.172  
 It is thus not the function of the court to act as a superior board of directors and the court is 
generally not interested in the wisdom or lack thereof in respect of the decisions taken by 
directors of a company.173 The court in Howard Smith v Ampol Petroleum Ltd174 expanded on 
this principle and stated- 
‘there is no appeal on merits from managements decisions(made by directors) to the courts of 
law; nor will the courts of law presume to act as a kind of supervisory board over decisions 
within the power of management honestly arrived at”175 
 
In Hogg v Cramphorn Ltd176 it was held that it is not for the courts to review the merits of a 
decision that the board of directors came to honestly.177 
It must be noted that the directors of a company are elected by the shareholders of the 
company and thus if the members elected as directors do not have the requisite skill, expertise 
or judgement and thus do not manage the company to its optimum potential then the 
shareholders have themselves to blame as they elected the board to run the company.178 
The test for good faith is subjective in nature and thus the relevant question is whether the 
director honestly believed that he or she acted in the best interest of the company. The 
relevant inquiry is thus the director’s state of mind when coming to a decision.179 
 The subjective test is limited, however, where there is an absence of a reasonable grounds for 
finding that the director in question acted in the best interest of the company, this will be 
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sufficient to find a lack of good faith and thus will constitute a breach of this duty.180 In 
Shuttleworth v Cox Brothers & Co (Maidenhead) Ltd181 the court emphasised the point that 
the best interests of the company are not to be assessed by the court itself. The court stated 
that the test is whether a reasonable man would have regarded the act of the directors to be in 
the best interests of the company.182 
 The court again stressed this point in Treck Corp Ltd v Millar183 wherein the court held that 
there must be reasonable grounds for the director in question to believe that he was in fact 
acting in the best interest of the company.  Then in Extrasure Travel Insurances Ltd v 
Scattergood184the court reiterated this principle and stated that there must be reasonable 
grounds for the belief that the directors were in fact acting in the best interest of the company.  
In the case of Charterbridge Corporation Ltd v Lloyd’s Bank185 a test was formulated and 
stated that the relevant inquiry is: whether an intelligent and honest person in the position of 
the director could under the same circumstances have reasonably come to find that he or she 
was in fact acting in the best interest of the company.186  
 This test is best understood by way of an example and a good example was illustrated in the 
case of Neptune( Vehicle washing equipment) ltd V Fitzgerald(No2)187 wherein the court held 
that the sole director of the company had not in fact acted in the best interest of the company 
by arranging for the company to make gratuitous donations to him on the termination of his 
contract of employment with the company. The court found that the director was acting in his 
own interests and not the company’s interests and thus breached his duty to act in good faith 
in respect of the company.188 
The most favoured illustration of what is regarded as acting in good faith and for the best 
interest of the company is demonstrated in the case of Re Smith v Fawcett Ltd,189 wherein the 
company’s articles of association give the board of directors an ‘absolute and uncontrolled 
discretion to refuse to register any transfer of shares’. When the one director passed away the 
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other surviving directors refused to register a transfer of his shares into the name of the 
executors. The court then held that in terms of the articles of association of the company, the 
only limitation on the directors’ powers was that they had to act in a manner that they 
believed to be in the best interest of the company. In this case the court could not detect any 
evidence of mala fides, or bad faith, thus the court refused to set the decision that the board of 
directors came to aside.190  
This case of Re Smith v Fawcett 191thus illustrates that the court when evaluating a decision 
that the board of directors has come to does not act as a superior board and will not set aside a 
decision, even, if the decision in question does not seem the most logical or a fair decision 
that could have been reached by the board. The Court will only set aside a decision reached 
by the board if it is clear that there is the presence of mala fides, in other words the directors 
did not act in good faith and in the best interest of the company when coming to that 
particular conclusion or decision. Therefore the powers that the directors have in respect of 
their company is qualified only by their ability to act in good faith and in the best interest of 
the company when coming to a conclusion or making a decision in respect of the company or 
its business.  
 In the case of a person being a director of more than one company the director in question 
owes a fiduciary duty to act in good faith to both companies separately and individually; this 
is true even if it is a subsidiary company.192 It must be noted that this is a new feature of the 
2008 Act previously at common law the directors of a company did not owe a fiduciary duty 
to a subsidiary of a principle company wherein they were the director.193  
 
4.3 The duty to exercise an independent judgement  
The duty to exercise an independent judgement is viewed by some academic writers as 
additional facet of the directors’ duty to act in good faith and in the best interest of the 
company.194 This may be the rationale as to why this specific common law duty was excluded 
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in the partial codification of the fiduciary duties of directors in section 76(2) and (3).195 Due 
to the fact that the common law and the 2008 Act operate parallel to each other this particular 
common law duty continues to find application in modern company law and still falls within 
the parameters of the fiduciary duties of directors. 
The common law principle with respect to this duty is well established in our law and states 
that in the exercising their powers as directors of the company and concluding what is in the 
best interest of the company, the directors must exercise an independent and autonomous 
mind to bear on the particular issue at hand.196 In other words this duty would entail that 
when a director is deciding what is in the best interest of the company he is under a legal duty 
to bring an independent unhindered mind to apply to the issue at hand and act accordingly.197 
As stated in chapter two (2) directors are not generally employees of the company and thus 
would be in direct violation of his duties if he allowed himself to be influenced by a third 
party or be a mere “puppet” of a third party.198 In S v Shaban199the court warned that 
“puppets” cannot lawfully be utilised in a company law structure. The court stated that 
“puppets” referred to persons placed on the board of directors who act as if they have taken 
part in decisions that they do not understand or pretend to have taken a role in the 
management of the company but have no idea what they have signed or agreed to.200  In S v 
De Jager201 wherein a director who had  resigned as a director of a company was then 
appointed as a puppet director for the same company, the court in the circumstances found 
that the irrespective of the resignation the person in question was a director. It should be 
noted however, that a puppet director is not lawful.202 Similarly, in Selangor united Rubber 
Estates Ltd v Cradock (No 3)203 in this case two nominee directors disregarded their fiduciary 
duties and instead followed the instructions of their controller, the court held that they were 
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mere puppets of the controller and were held liable for the improper use by their controller in 
smuggling funds belonging to the company.204  
It must be noted that a company may not escape liability from a binding contract that was 
willingly entered into by its directors on the contention that the directors failed to exercise an 
independent judgment in deciding to enter into the contract.205 
 This duty has particular relevance to a nominee director. A nominee director is someone who 
has been appointed by a nominator to represent his interest at board meetings.206 
Nevertheless, a nominee director is a lawfully elected director, however, he is obliged to act 
under a duty to his nominator as well as the fiduciary duty to the company.207 Irrespective of 
these two separate duties a nominee director is expected to bring an independent and 
unhindered mind to what he believed to be in the best interest of the company.208 
In Fisheries Development Corporation of SA Ltd v Jorgensen209 the court stated that in 
respect of a director’s duty to exercise an independent judgment and to take decisions 
according to the best interest of the company in respect of nominee directors that although 
nominee directors may be representing the interests of their nominator that are obligated in 
terms of law to serve the interest of the company exclusively at the exclusion of their 
nominator.210 Therefore a nominee director is not allowed to have conflicting allegiances, the 
interests of the company is overriding over those of the nominator.211  
It can be deduced from judicial decisions that the general legal principle is that once the 
nominee director is appointed he is obliged to act in the interest of the company and not the 
nominator.212 However, the nominee director may still converse with the nominator and this 
consultation will not amount to a breach of the duty to exercise an independent judgment in  
the best interest of the company  as long as the nominee director brings a unhindered 
autonomous mind in the exercise of his duty.213 It must be noted that a more flexible 
approach has been taken in England, New Zealand and Australia with respect to the duty to 
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exercise an independent judgment, this trend towards a more modern flexible approach may 
influence the South African position in the future, but presently, the strict inflexible approach 
with regards to nominee directors is still in application.  
 
4.4. The overlap between corporate governance and the fiduciary duty of good faith 
Due to the drastic changes in modern company law internationally corporate governance has 
become a vital aspect of corporate law and the way companies in South Africa run their 
business.214 Corporate governance is an assortment of guidelines and recommendations that 
assist those who are running the company and that is grounded largely in the fiduciary duties 
of directors.215 
The 2008 Act introduces corporate governance into statute for the first time.216  Previously 
corporate governance has been viewed as a voluntary process through King I217 and then 
replaced in 2002 with King II218. The 2008 Act recognises corporate governance and included 
it in the Act for the first time. Company law sets a legal framework for the operation of a 
company and King III provides a set of recommendations that aim at providing guidance to 
the directors of a company to achieve the optimum efficiency in managing the company.219   
Thus it is said that the 2008 Act and King III complement each other in its operation.220  
The chapter on transparency and accountability in the 2008 Act has led to the partial 
codification of the director’s duties in section 76 of the 2008 Act.221 Corporate governance 
has been defined by King as  
‘The way in which companies are directed and controlled or the principles and practices 
which are regarded as appropriate conduct by directors and managers’.222  
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The standard that is required of a director was dealt with in King II223 and is now set out in 
section 76 of the 2008 Act. The fiduciary duties and the duty of care and skill in terms of the 
common law and the 2008 Act are considered a cornerstone of corporate governance in South 
Africa.224 McLennan225 argues that company law as a whole has to do with corporate 
governance however, the King II report states that ‘directors of a company are the focal point 
of the corporate governance system’.226  
One of the main principles of corporate governance is that directors must always act bona 
fide in the best interest of the company227 which is in essence is the fiduciary duty of a 
director to act in good faith.  King II228 encourages an inclusive approach to corporate 
governance, this entails that not only are directors liable to the company when they come to a 
conclusion or decision in respect of some aspect of the management of the business but they 
have to also be aware of the expectations and interests of the stakeholders, which comprise of 
the shareholders, employees and society as a whole.229 It is suggested that the 2008 Act has 
adopted an enlightened shareholder approach, in terms of this approach directors have a duty 
to not only maximise profit but they have a duty to maintain trust and confidence not only in 
respect of the company but with the company’s stakeholders as well.230  
It is clear therefore that there is a link between the duty of good faith which is based on trust, 
honesty and loyalty and corporate governance as expected by the 2008 Act and King III.231 
Corporate governance emphasised the trust that is created by the fiduciary relationship 
between the directors of the company and the company itself as well as indirectly the 
shareholders, therefore qualities such as integrity, transparency and accountability are 
essential elements that the directors must in the carrying out of their duties and is encouraged 
by the principles of corporate governance.232 Thus the link between these two aspects is clear 
and is utilised to assist in the efficient running of a company and will mitigate against the 
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breaching of the primary fiduciary duty that a director has to act in good faith. It must be 
noted that corporate governance largely involves a system of principles or practices that 
enable directors to discharge their legal responsibilities.233 
The partial codification is beneficial to corporate governance as it has assisted directors in 
further understanding their duties implicitly and creates a clear written authority of what is 
expected from the directors of a company.234 The common law still applies irrespective of the 
partial codification of directors duties in section 76(3) of the 2008 Act. Thus any well-
established principles in terms of common law and definitions or accepted principles in terms 
of judicial decisions are still applicable and this guarantees that the duties of directors remain 
flexible and adaptable.235  Flexibility and adaptability is of the utmost importance as the 
economic state as well as the law itself is not stagnant but ever-changing and will thus allow 
for growth and development as the needs of directors, shareholders and the company as well 
as society at large change. 
 The partial-codification of director’s duties has been regarded as a step in the right direction 
for corporate governance and is also seen as a necessary move towards wider protection for 
not only the company but for all stakeholders.236  
In contrast to this statement, however, a very important point was made by Judin whereby he 
emphasised that corporate governance is merely a recommended practice that will assist in 
the running of an efficient company it is not a hard and fast rule that the board of directors are 
obliged to follow.237 Judin argues that if a particular decision reached by the board of 
directors is not in the best interest of the company even if the decision conforms to the 
standards of corporate governance, to follow on this decision, would constitute a breach of 
their fiduciary duty to act in good faith.238 Thus the board will be held liable for any loss 
suffered by the company.239 The emphasis is thus on the fact that corporate governance is 
flexible and not static as has to be adapted to each particular situation looking at the relevant 
circumstances.240 Corporate governance is there for assistance to achieve the efficient 
management of the company, it is not rules that have to be followed, especially where they 
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would result in the breach of the paramount duty of directors to act in good faith. Judin has 
emphasised this succinctly by stating- 
“The duty of good faith is the highest duty of any director. Included is the duty of loyalty, 
acting in the best interest of the company and honestly applying one’s mind to the issue 
before the board. It is the obligation to follow this legal duty that has resulted in a general 
acceptance that corporate governance codes should be on a “comply or explain” basis, rather 
than “comply or else” basis. In short governance codes should contain recommended 
practices, which, if not in the best interest of the company, the directors have a legal duty to 
adopt an alternative”241 
 
4.5. Conclusion 
As stated in this chapter the fiduciary duty of a director to act in good faith has now been 
partially codified in section 76(3)(a) of the 2008 Act. There is however, a lack of detail in the 
statutory codification of this duty and thus the common law and judicial decisions still apply 
extensively in respect of determining the content of this duty.  
It is clear from this chapter that the duty of good faith is the paramount over-arching duty that 
all directors owe in respect of the company242and is the primary fiduciary duty from which all 
other fiduciary duties flow.243 The duty of good faith is one of subjective good faith244 and 
thus the inquiry is into whether the director acted in what he honestly and genuinely believed 
to be the best interest of the company.  
Due to the fact that the duty of good faith is subjective in nature this means that if a decision 
made by a director is under scrutiny before a court, the court will not act as a superior board 
of directors, but the question would be whether the director acted bona fide and in what he 
believed to be the best interest of the company.245  The court will not readily set aside a 
decision that a director individually came to or collectively as the board of directors unless 
there is a lack of reasonable grounds for the finding246 or there is the existence of mala fides 
in coming to that decision.247  
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As mentioned above the duty to exercise an independent judgement is not partially codified 
under section 76(3) of the 2008 Act, the rationale behind this is that this common law 
fiduciary duty is a facet of the primary fiduciary duty of a director to act in good faith and in 
the best interest of the company which is partially codified in section 76(3)(a) and (b) of the 
2008 Act.248 Thus this duty still has application within the partially codified duty of good 
faith as well as in terms of the common law as the common law and statute operate in 
tandem. 
Finally, there is a clear link between corporate governance and the duty to act in good faith, 
corporate governance refers to principles and mechanisms that assist directors to reach the 
optimum level of efficiency within a company as well as to discharge their duties in respect 
of the company.249 The 2008 Act recognises corporate governance for the first time and it is 
said that both the act and King III complement each other.250 It must be noted, however, that 
although there is a clear link between fiduciary duties and corporate governance, the fiduciary 
duties always take precedent, the board of directors are not obliged to follow the 
recommendations that are made in the form of corporate governance codes but they are 
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5. CHAPTER FIVE: THE FIDUCIARY DUTY OF A DIRECTOR TO ACT FOR A 
PROPER OR PERMISSABLE PURPOSE. 
 
This chapter explores the duty of a director of a company to act for a proper or permissible 
purpose in terms of the common law and the now partially codified version in terms of the 
2008 Act. This chapter will also look at any noteworthy judicial decisions regarding this duty 
and academic opinions. Finally, although, the academic literature on fiduciary duties of 
directors is immense there seems to be a definite lack of literature on the fiduciary duty to act 
for a proper or permissible purpose as was pointed out by Du Plessis where he said ‘ …it is 
remarkable that not a single article in South African legal periodicals deal pertinently with 
directors’ duty to use powers for their proper or permissible purpose.’252  Thus this chapter 
will aim to fill the chasm in the academic literature regarding the duty to act for a proper or 
permissible purpose and explore this duty fully.  
 
5.1. Introduction 
Directors may not simply exercise their powers in good faith and what they believe to be the 
best interest of the company, although this is their fundamental duty, section 76(3)(a) of the 
2008 Act requires that directors also exercise their powers for a proper purpose.253  A ‘proper 
purpose’ was not defined in the 2008 Act, however, the common law has interpreted this to 
mean that directors must exercise their powers for the objective purpose for which the power 
was conferred to them and for no other ulterior or collateral purpose.254 
Therefore there are two separate fiduciary duties that have been partially codified under 




Section 76(3)(a)  of the 2008 Act states-  
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(3)  Subject to subsections (4) and (5), a director of a company, when acting in that 
capacity, must exercise the powers and perform the functions of a director 
 (a) in good faith and for a proper purpose; 
 
These two duties are separate concepts and encompass two distinct fiduciary duties, although 
they fall under the same section of the 2008 Act, however, these two duties have the effect 
that even if directors have subjectively acted in good faith and what they honestly believed to 
be the best interest of the company, they may still objectively have breached their duty to act 
for a proper purpose.256 Therefore although the duty to act in good faith and the duty to act 
for a proper or permissible purpose is two distinct fiduciary duties they work in conjunction 
to each other to ensure the discretionary powers that the directors possess are not abused. 
 It must thus be noted that most leading South African academics in this field all refer to the 
duty to act for a proper or permissible purpose, however, everyone interprets it slightly 
differently. Beuthin does not treat this as a separate fiduciary duty but simply as an aspect of 
the duty to act in good faith.257 Blackman refers to the duty to exercise powers for a proper 
purpose.258 Cilliers and Benade use ‘failure to exercise…powers for the purpose for which 
they were conferred’.259 Hahlo talks about the ‘director’s duty to act within their powers’260 
Williams refers to the ‘duties to exercise powers for a proper purpose’261; and finally Cassim 
refers to this duty simply as proper purpose.262  It is thus clear from this short summary that 
this duty could be referred to by a number of different names and may be phrased both 
positively and negatively263, however, for the purpose of this study this fiduciary duty will be 
referred to as the duty to act for a proper or permissible purpose.  
It must be noted that section76(3)(a) is declaratory of the common law fiduciary duties and 
thus has no legal effect on the common law fiduciary duty to act in good faith and for a 
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proper purpose.264 This aspect of how the common law and 2008 Act operate in relation to 
each other has been explored further in chapter 3.  
Section 76(3)(a) however, has a useful purpose in that it removes any doubt relating to the 
existence of this specific fiduciary duty instead of simply disregarding it as another aspect of 
the duty of good faith as some academics mentioned above have interpreted.265 
 
5.2. The content of the duty to act for a proper or permissible purpose 
As aforementioned, the directors are now obliged to exercise their powers for a proper 
purpose by both the common law and statute.266 It is thus regarded as an abuse of power if a 
director utilises their powers for any purpose other than the purpose that the powers in 
question were conferred on them.267  The purpose behind this duty is in fact an attempt by the 
courts to control and maintain the exercise of discretionary power by directors of the 
company.268 The existence of subjective good faith is not enough to save the exercise of 
power by a director if the power was exercised for an ulterior or collateral purpose.269 
Therefore the test for ‘proper purpose’ is objective in nature and not subjective as in the case 
of the duty of good faith.270 
Consequently, if the directors of a company use their powers for a collateral or improper 
purpose, they cannot use the defence that they were acting in what they honestly believed to 
be the best interest of the company as an attempt to escape liability.271 The duty to act for a 
proper or permissible purpose is separate and thus additional to the duty to act bona fide.272  
The presence of bad faith and dishonesty indicate that the powers exercised by the directors 
were not done so for a proper purpose. This principle was explained in the case of The 
Australian Metropolitan Life Assurance Co ltd v Ure273 where the court stated the following- 
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‘although it is a power (power to issue shares) which necessarily involves some discretion, it 
must be exercised, as all such powers must be, bona fide, that is for the purpose of which it 
was conferred , not arbitrarily or at the absolute will of the directors, but honestly in the 
interest of the shareholders as a whole.’274 
This duty often becomes contentious with regards to the issuing of shares by directors 
although the board of directors have the power to issue shares that have been authorised in 
the memorandum of incorporation (MOI).275 
In Hogg v Cramphorn Ltd276 the court held that the directors had exercised their powers for 
an improper purpose, the power in question related to the issuing of shares.  The court found 
that although the directors of the company had honestly and genuinely believed in good faith 
that the takeover would not be in the best interest of the company, its employees or their 
customers, the issuing of the preference shares that was contrary to the constitution of the 
company and that carried special voting rights of ten votes per share, was nevertheless an 
inappropriate exercise of their power and thus in breach of their fiduciary duty to act for a 
proper or permissible purpose. The court found that the primary purpose for the issuing of 
shares is for the raising of share capital, however, in this case it was not done for this primary 
purpose but to ensure that the directors did not lose control of the company. Buckley J found 
that the manipulation of the voting position could not therefore be found to be within the 
bounds of acting for a proper purpose. Finally, the court held that the issuing of shares could 
be ratified by the members at a general meeting, however, the court emphasised that it was 
unconstitutional for the directors to exercise their powers to issue shares in order to avoid a 
takeover, the purpose of destroying the existing majority or to create a new majority.277  
Similarly in the case of Howard Smith Ltd v Ampol Petroleum Ltd278 the board of directors 
awarded further shares to Howard Smith whom they preferred in order to dilute the majority 
shareholding of Ampol Petroleum and assist in assuring the take- over bid by Howard Smith. 
The court found that it was unconstitutional for the directors to use their fiduciary powers for 
the sole purpose of destroying the existing majority or creating a new majority. The court 
noted further that this would apply even if the directors believed in good faith that they were 
acting in the best interest of the company and they were not going to receive any personal 
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benefit or advantage for themselves including retaining their position as directors. The court 
concluded that the principle was clear, no board of directors may interfere with the 
constitutional right of shareholders to decide the outcome of a take-over bid.279  
In Punt v Symons & Co ltd280 the board of directors issued shares to their friends and family 
with the intention of creating a majority which would result in them being able to pass a 
special resolution that would allow them to change the constitution of the company so as to 
deny certain shareholders special rights that were conferred on them by the constitution of the 
company. Similarly, in Piercy v Mills281 the directors of a company issued shares with the 
intention of creating a majority that would allow them to prevent the election of further 
directors to the board and which would have the effect that the established directors would 
become the minority. The courts in both cases held that the directors exercised their powers 
for an improper purpose282 and were in breach of their fiduciary duty to act for a proper or 
permissible purpose. 
One of the primary purposes for which directors may exercise their power, is for the issuing 
of shares.283 Directors must therefore exercise their powers to issue shares for a proper 
purpose and not an improper purpose, it had been held that a valid purpose for issuing shares 
is to raise share capital for the company. 284 It should be noted, however, that this is not the 
only proper purpose for which shares may be issued, shares may be issued where it is part of 
a commercial contract to do so or to assist in giving the company financial stability, the 
directors in this case would be regarded as exercising their powers to issue shares for a proper 
purpose.285 
 An issuing of shares to alter or misrepresent and manipulate the balance of voting power is 
an improper exercise of the power to issue shares286 as well as issuing shares with the 
intention of frustrating or assisting a take-over bid for control of the company; or for the 
purpose of creating a new majority or removing the existing majority287. These ‘purposes’ 
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have been interpreted by the courts as being an improper use of the power to issue shares by 
directors288. 
Determining the purpose for which a director has exercised his power from the facts of the 
case is not an easy undertaking.289 The question as to whether a director acted for a proper 
purpose requires an inquiry into the subjective state of mind of the director in question.290  
Where there is more than one purpose according to the facts of the case the court must 
identify the dominant or principle purpose.291  In Mills v Mills292 the court held that if the 
principle or dominant purpose is found to be improper the court must regard the exercise of 
power as being voidable. This decision was then confirmed in Howard Smith Ltd v Ampol 
Petroleum Ltd293 and Treck Corp v Millar.294  
 For the exercise of power to be considered as valid, the purpose cannot be improper and if it 
was improper in any way, the improper purpose cannot be the reason that the power in 
question was exercised.295 Put differently, it would mean that if the exercise of power was 
found to be for a proper or permissible purpose and in the best interest of the company, the 
mere fact that an incidental consequence of the particular exercise of power resulted in a 
take-over bid or allowed the directors to retain power, will not render the exercise of the 
power as improper.296  
 
5.3. The Tests developed by the Courts 
Merely because a director denies that they have exercised their powers for a proper purpose 
does not mean that the courts will believe the director; the court must establish whether the 
testimony is credible under the circumstances.297 Any disputes in terms of civil litigation has 
to be determined before a court of law on a balance of probabilities.298 
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In Extrasure Travel Insurance Ltd v Scattergood299 the court held that the law regarding 
proper purpose is well established and clear, further the court stated that it is not necessary to 
prove dishonesty on behalf of the director or that he was aware that he was acting for an 
ulterior purpose. The court went on to establish a four step test that courts should apply. The 
test states that a court must: 
1. Identify the particular power that is being challenged; 
2. Identify the proper purpose for which the power was given to the directors; 
3. Identify the substantial purpose for which the power was in fact exercised; and 
4. Decide whether the purpose was proper.  
 
Du Plessis300  in contrast, argues that the test that the South African courts should adopt in 
determining whether powers have been misused or abused by directors is the approach taken 
in Howard Smith Ltd v Ampol Petroleum Ltd.301  The first step in this test is to determine 
what the purpose for which the power was conferred to the directors of the company. The 
court did take cognisance of the fact that there may be multiple purposes in such as case the 
principle or dominant purpose must be identified. 302 The second step is to establish whether 
under the circumstances the directors misused or abused the powers conferred upon them.  
In essence what principle is established from this test is that if the decision made was 
primarily or substantially taken and falls within the ambit of what the power was conferred 
upon the directors for, the court will not set the decision aside irrespective of whether 
indecently the power may have been exercised for an improper purpose.303 The same 
principle phrased differently would entail that if the decision made was primarily for an 
improper or impermissible purpose the court will be obliged to set aside the decision 
irrespective of whether the powers may have partially been exercised for a proper purpose.304  
Du Plessis submitted that this test should be used by South African courts when determining 
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whether the exercise of power by the directors was done for a proper or permissible 
purpose.305 
It must be noted that where a director has not acted in what he genuinely believes to be the 
best interest of the company, this breach of his fiduciary duty is incapable of being ratified, 
however, in contrast to this, where the director has exercised his powers in good faith and 
what he genuinely believes to be the best interest of the company, but has acted for an 
improper or impermissible purpose then this breach is capable of ratification by an ordinary 
resolution passed at a general meeting.306  
 
5.4. Section 38 of the 2008 Act and the Duty to act for a proper purpose  
Section 38 (1) of the 2008 Act gives the board of directors the power to issue shares. This 
power as aforementioned, is a fiduciary power that must be exercised in good faith and for a 
proper or permissible purpose.307 Due to section 38 of the 2008 Act this particular fiduciary 
power of issuing shares and the duty to act for a proper purpose becomes more important.  
The common law rules that have been discussed in this chapter, however, still have 
application particularly the stance taken by Buckley J in Hogg v Cramphorn Ltd308 where the 
court reaffirmed the principle that the directors’ power to issue shares is conferred upon them 
with the primary purpose to raise share capital for the company.309 It must be noted however, 
that although the primary purpose for issuing shares is to raise share capital this is not the 
only valid purpose.310 Issuing shares so as to ensure the financial stability of a company or 
where there has been an agreement to issue shares are both examples of other valid purposes 
for which shares may be issued.311 
Where directors have exercised their power for an improper purpose and this decision is set 
aside by the court, the directors will be jointly and severally liable to compensate the 
company for any loss suffered as a consequence of the improper exercise of power.312 A good 
illustration of this was in the case of Bishopsgate Investment Management Ltd(In liquidation) 
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v Maxwell (No2)313 wherein a director of a company was found to be in breach of his 
fiduciary duty in releasing company assets for no compensation to another company for 
whom he was also a director, the  court accordingly found him liable for the loss that the 
company suffered.  
Emphasis must be placed particularly on the fact that section 77(2)(a) of the  2008 Act 
provides that a director will be held liable according to the principles of common law314 
regarding the breach of a fiduciary duty as contemplated in section 77(3)(a) of the 2008 Act, 
in other words according to the duty of good faith and to act for a proper purpose. Further 
exploration into the remedies for breach of a fiduciary duty, however, is beyond the scope of 
this study.  
 
5.5. Conclusion 
 Therefore it is clear that the duty of a director to act for a proper or permissible purpose is an 
essential fiduciary duty and is separate from the primary fiduciary duty of a director to act for 
a proper purpose.315 This is emphasised by the fact that this duty is partially codified along 
with the duty to act in good faith in section 76(3)(a) of the 2008 Act, this has set the position 
that this duty to act for a proper purpose is distinct and not merely another aspect of the duty 
to act in good faith, as some academics have interpreted it.316  
The duty to act for a proper or permissible purpose entails the director exercise his powers for 
the reason which they were conferred upon him and not for any ulterior or collateral 
purpose.317 This fiduciary duty is an attempt by the courts to mitigate and control against the 
abuse of power that is conferred upon directors of a company.318 This duty is objective in 
nature and often comes under scrutiny in respect of the fiduciary power of director to issue 
shares. The judicial decision have established clear principles as to what would be regarded 
as exercising the power to issue shares for a proper purpose as well as what will be seen as 
issuing shares for an improper purpose.319 The courts have also established tests to assist in 
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deciding whether directors have exercised their powers for an improper purpose or have 
abused the powers conferred upon them. 
 This issuing of shares is a contentious issue in respect of the fiduciary duty of a director to 
act for a proper purpose and thus directors should be extra vigilant when issuing shares and 
ensure it is not for a collateral purpose. Section 38(1) of the 2008 Act places more emphasis 
on the director’s power to issue shares and thus has elevated the importance of the fiduciary 
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6. CHAPTER SIX: CONCLUDING REMARKS 
 
6.1. Introduction 
The subject of the fiduciary duties of directors is one of great importance in the scheme of 
company law. Directors have the ability to control the company and its interest, directors are 
thus in a position of power that allows them to control the profitability and the success of a 
company.321 The powers of directors are thus far reaching and have a definite impact such as 
influencing investments both domestically and internationally.322 As the old adage goes, with 
great power comes great responsibility and thus the duties of directors are of paramount 
importance in that the fiduciary duties control how and when directors may exercise their 
discretionary powers323.  
The fiduciary duties of directors is recognised as a cornerstone of company law.324 It is thus 
imminently important for directors to understand what is expected of them and be aware of 
their duties so that they do not breach their duties negligently or abuse their discretionary 
powers.325 
The fiduciary duties of directors has been well explored by the leading academics in the field 
however, there is a definite gap in the literature when it comes to the specific fiduciary duty 
of a director to act for a proper or permissible purpose.326  This study aims to fill the chasm in 
the academic literature regarding this particular fiduciary duty.  Although the academic 
literature regarding these fiduciary duties is extensive, it has not been examined in a new light 
since the partial codification of the fiduciary duties of a director in section 76(3) of the 2008 
Act. Hence, this study aims at exploring the specific fiduciary duties of a director to act in 
good faith and for a proper purpose in terms of the common law and statute as well as 
examine whether there has been any alterations or developments since the change from 
common law to partial codification. Further, this study aims at exporting the relationship 
between the common law and the 2008 Act and how they operate in respect of each other.  
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6.2. Findings of the Study  
Chapter two(2) of this study explored the definition of a director in terms of the 2008 Act, as 
well as the meaning of a fiduciary in the context of company law. This chapter revealed that 
the definition of a director in terms of section 1 of the 2008 Act is in fact broad and thus 
problematic as it includes other members within the company as falling within the ambit of 
the definition and results in these other members having to bear the burden of these fiduciary 
duties without the benefit of exercising any discretionary power.327 This chapter also 
discovered that the directors are in a fiduciary relationship with the company and once a 
person accepts the position of a director he enters immediately into this fiduciary relationship 
with the company.328 
Chapter three (3) was significant as it went on to explore the relationship between the 
common law and the 2008 Act.  This chapter noted that the common law regarding fiduciary 
duties of a director is extensive and well developed and has been greatly influenced by that of 
English law.  This chapter revealed that the partial codification of the fiduciary duties of a 
director was in accordance to international trends and the purpose behind it was to make the 
fiduciary duties of directors more accessible as well as to instil clarity to the law.329 Many 
academics such as Cassim, however, view the partial codification as a wasted opportunity as 
the legislature failed to address the problematic areas in the common law such as the 
conflicting judicial decisions and instead merely restated the common law.330 It is the opinion 
of the writer that the legislature did indeed waste the opportunity as instead of addressing the 
shortfalls in the common law the legislature restated the common law fiduciary duties in such 
a vague way that it cannot be interpreted without the background of the common law. 
Therefore none of the problematic areas were actually addressed or reformed by the 
legislature.  
 The exploration of the partial codification of the duty to act in good faith and for a proper 
purpose in terms of section 76(3)(a) of the 2008 Act revealed that there has been almost not 
alteration or development to the common law interpretation of these duties except that the 
duty of good faith was now extended to subsidiary companies.331 Further, the fact that the 
duty of good faith and the duty to act for a proper purpose recognised the duty to act for a 
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proper purpose as a separate fiduciary duty and not merely another facet of the duty to act for 
a proper purpose as some academics interpreted.332 In respect of the relationship between the 
common law and statute, the 2008 Act has not rendered the common law irrelevant  and the 
common law is still very much applicable.333 The legal position is that the common law and 
the 2008 Act operate parallel to each other and that directors are now obliged to follow their 
fiduciary duties in terms of both common law and statute.334 
 
Chapter four (4) focused on the fiduciary duty of a director to act in good faith, which is the 
most fundamental duty that a director possesses and from which all other fiduciary duties 
expand.335 The duty of good faith refers to subjective good faith.336  The courts cannot act as 
a superior board of directors and the correct inquiry is whether the director honestly believed 
to be acting in the best interest of the company.337 The court will therefore only set aside a 
decision made by a director where there is clear indication of mala fide or lack of reasonable 
grounds to reach that decision.338 Finally, the link between corporate governance and the 
fiduciary duty of good faith was explored and it was discovered that there is in fact a clear 
link between these two concepts which are both based on trust, honesty and loyalty.339 The 
2008 Act also recognised corporate governance for the first time and the Act and King III are 
said to complement each other.340 Nevertheless, it was emphasised that the duty of good faith 
always takes precedent over corporate governance codes, thus a director is always obliged to 
follow his duties but not necessarily the codes of corporate governance.341 
Chapter five(5)  explored the fiduciary duty of a director to act for a proper or permissible 
purpose and sought to fill the gap in the existing body of academic literature. This duty is 
objective in nature and entails that a director may not exercise his powers for an improper or 
ulterior purpose but must exercise them for the purpose for which they were conferred upon 
him.342 This chapter noted that this duty becomes highly contentious with regards to the 
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power of directors to issue shares and thus the courts have established tests to assist them in 
determining when a director has abused his power or used it for an improper purpose.343 This 
chapter also discovered that section 38(1) of the 2008 Act has placed more emphasis on the 
director’s power to issue shares and has thus directly resulted in placing a higher degree of 
importance on duty of a director to act for a proper purpose.344 
Therefore it is clear to see from the brief summary of the findings that this study explored 
fully the duties of a director to act in good faith and for a proper purpose. The study also 
focused on the definition of a director and the meaning of a fiduciary in the context of 
company law. The study looked at for the first time whether there was in fact any 
development since the partial codification of the directors’ duties to act in good faith and for 
a proper purpose, followed by an in-depth exploration into the reasoning behind the partial 
codification of fiduciary duties of directors. Finally the study also sets out the current 
relationship between the 2008 Act and the common law.  
 
6.3. Contributions of the study 
As aforementioned this study attempted a thorough exploration of the primary duty of a 
director to act in good faith and for a proper purpose. The study attempted to evaluate these 
two fiduciary duties fully and then examine whether there had been any development since 
the partial codification of these duties in section 76(3)(a) of the 2008 Act. This study sought 
to revisit the well -established subject of fiduciary duties in a new light and also attempted to 
fill the chasm in the existing academic literature relating to the duty of a director to act for a 
proper purpose. This study attempted to make the position in respect of these two duties clear 
so as to assist directors in understanding what is expected of them so as to prevent the 
negligent breaching of these fundamental duties.  
This study sought to assist in the interpretation of fiduciary duties since the partial 
codification so as to assist in the understanding of the 2008 Act and finally set out the present 
stance on the relationship between the 2008 Act and the common law and explain to what 
extent the common law is still relevant in the context of fiduciary duties.  
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It is therefore the opinion of the writer that all the research questions and goals have been 
fully answered or explored during the process of this study and will be beneficial to the 
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